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causal unitWirkungseinheit (ger.)

  • A closed system consisting of interacting elements.
    wholeness
    1870

    The cell […] is not individual, whatever M. Virchow may say, for it lives only in the life of the whole; it does not possess in itself its cause of existence, it does not contain within its enveloping membrane any sufficient causal unity.

    Dunster, E.S. (1870). The idea of life, as deduced from contemporary physiology. Virchow – Claude Bernard. The Anthropological Review 8, 49-69: 67.

    1904

    In dieser Tendenz, die Elemente gegeneinander aufs äußerste zu verselbständigen, um sie auf Grund dieser Sonderung zu einer um so engeren, organischen Wirkungseinheit zusammenzuführen, offenbart sich die weltgeschichtliche Tendenz der neuzeitlichen Differenzierung, die die trüben, unbeholfnen Produktionsverschmelzungen früherer Epochen aufhebt und jedes Element zu der ganz arbeitsteiligen, mit keiner andren verwechselbaren Leistung führt.

    Simmel, G. (1904). Kant. Sechzehn Vorlesungen, gehalten an der Berliner Universität: 154 (14. Vorl.).
    1921
    Die lebendige Wirkungseinheit eines Wesens prägt sich in der sichtbaren Organisation seiner Gestalt aus
    Ermatinger, E. (1921). Das dichterische Kunstwerk: 189.
    1925
    Nun wissen wir schon, daß die sogenannte Ganzheit der (energetischen oder elektrischen) physischen Struktur für sich genommen eine Wirkungseinheit ist, und daß alles Ganzheitliche, was etwa in Frage kommt, dieser Struktur von außen, nämlich von der gegebenen physischen Form, aufgezwungen ist.

    Driesch, H. (1925). »Physische Gestalten« und Organismen. Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik 5, 1-11: 7; cf. also 4.

    1932
    »Individuum« bezeichnet also Vereinheitlichung von Komponenten durch organische Relationen zu höheren Wirkungseinheiten, wobei beim Aufstieg in der onto- und phylogenetischen Stufenreihe diese Relationen immer fester, die Einzelteile also immer differenzierter und weniger selbständig werden.
    Bertalanffy, L. von (1932). Theoretische Biologie, vol. 1: 272.
    1948

    We must […] recognize different types of systems. There is the system which is a “whole” in the strictest sense. Such a system acts as a causal unit; it acts causally in a way which is something other than the summed causal actions of its parts in isolation. The parts are internally related. Such a system may be called an intrinsic whole. A chemical molecule is an intrinsic whole in this sense; so is an animal in some respects, but not in others.

    Agar, W.E. (1948). The wholeness of the living organism. Philosophy of Science 15, 179-191: 179.

    1992

    But what is it about the super-organism concept that attracted Clements and many others to it? Perhaps they had a sense of the integration of causation in ecological communities, of direct and indirect interdependency of species populations leading to such phenomena as coevolution, ecosystem persistence, succession, resilience in the face of disturbance, and catastrophic change in ecosystem structure as a result of perturbations to one or a few “keystone” components. These facts require a concept of system, of causal unity between an entity and its environment, be it an organ in an organism or a species in a community. Ecosystem is such a concept.

    Burns, T.P. (1992). Ecosystem: a powerful concept and paradigm for ecology. Bulletin of the Ecological Society of America 73, 39-43: 42.

    2010

    organisms themselves can be neatly identified as an objective locus of ecological interaction. This is only made possible if the nature of their cohesion (in virtue of which, precisely, they can be individuated as acting as a causal unit, and not only as a collection of individuals) has been previously made clear on a theoretical basis.

    Martens, J. (2010). Organisms in evolution. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 32, 373-400: 396-7.

    2010

    Wilson has demonstrated that there is unity within particular species taxa, but he has not demonstrated that there is causal unity among different species.

    Ereshefksky, M. (2010). Darwin’s solution to the species problem. Synthese 175, 405-425: 418.